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1. Introduction 
Over recent years, insurgencies (also known as asymmetric, low intensity, or guerilla conflicts) 
have re-emerged in the world’s political consciousness. Part of this is due to the multiple 
insurgencies occurring in Iraq, which are interfering with attempts by the United States to 
reestablish an effective government within that nation. However, many other insurgencies are 
also extant world wide. A partial list of nations suffering from insurgencies would include the 
Philippines, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Kashmir, Yemen, Djibouti, Columbia, Sri Lanka, and Congo-
Zaire (Kaplan 2005, Economist 2005a, Economist 2005b, Economist 2006a, Economist 2006b, 
New York Times 2006). Many of these insurgencies have religious or ethnic overtones, although 
some do not (O’Neill 1990). For example, drug trafficking appears to drive the insurgency in 
Columbia (Kaplan 2005).  
Historically speaking, insurgencies are nothing new. Raiding, from which insurgencies or 
“guerilla” warfare developed, in fact predate conventional warfare (Keegan 1994). The term 
“guerilla” itself was coined during the Napoleonic Wars when numerous Spaniards began to 
pursue tactics of sporadic raids to harass the occupying armies of Napoleon (Beckett 2001). 
These raiders would then fade into the countryside whenever French conventional army forces 
would pursue them. In the last century, however, three primary changes have occurred in the 
dynamics of insurgencies. Better communications have increased the reach and speed of news 
and propaganda from both insurgents and counter-insurgents. Also, many—though not all—
insurgencies have shifted from a rural to an urban setting. Finally, the availability of weapons 
facilitating asymmetric warfare has increased enormously, particularly due to (1) the growth of 
overseas communities willing to support insurgent movements in their motherland with money, (2) 
the emergence of great powers willing to use insurgents to fight “proxy wars,” (3) the growth and 
sale of narcotics as a cash crop to finance weapons procurement by insurgents, and (4) the 
growth of international commerce and travel in general, which has increased the permeability of 
national borders to arms smuggling.  
These factors taken together make the management of insurgencies more difficult than in former 
times, which has global implications. Depending on one’s point of view, any particular insurgency 
may be seen as “good” or “bad.” However, the most salient fact of any insurgency—and its 
resulting counter-insurgency—is the significant loss of life that often overwhelms whatever 
political benefits may accrue to either side in the conflict. Allied with this is the disruption or 
destruction of a region’s infrastructure and institutions, leading to further chaos, deaths, and 
potentially more civil unrest. Hence, whether a given insurgency can be effectively suppressed 
and what is the minimum force method for doing so is of clear interest to policy makers world-
wide. For these reasons, any methodology that can capture the essential dynamics of insurgency 
evolution at a strategic level and can improve policy makers’ mental models would appear 
desirable.  
Accordingly, the purpose of this paper is to demonstrate whether the methodology of system 
dynamics (Forrester 1958, Sterman 2000) can be used to develop a strategic computer 
simulation model to: (1) yield useful insights into how insurgencies evolve dynamically under 
modern conditions and (2) determine under which conditions insurgencies might be mitigated. In 
particular, this paper shall concentrate on insurgencies that occur primarily in urban rather than 
rural settings (see Coyle 1985 for an excellent treatment of rural insurgencies) and in which the 
primary opponent of the insurgency is based in a different nation. To meet theses goals, this 
paper will first develop a plausible model congruent with what is known about insurgencies using 
the system dynamics methodology (SD). Then the paper will test whether the model can 
reasonably replicate the dynamic behavior of the variables (e.g. active insurgents, foreign troops, 
etc.) associated with a case study of a particular insurgency. This testing will develop reasonable 
confidence that any insights resulting from model—and hence the system dynamics methodology 
in general—are worth further study. Then, a brief sensitivity analysis of the model to its various 
parameters will be performed to determine some potential insights. Finally, the response of the 
model to an example pair of insurgency management policies will be tested. The purpose of both 
these analyses is not to determine final solutions for the problems of insurgency management—
that will require much future work—but rather only to demonstrate that SD is a fruitful avenue for 
such inquiry.  
The Anglo-Irish War (also known as the Irish War of Independence) of 1916-23 has been chosen 
as a benchmark for the model in this paper for several reasons. First, and perhaps most 
importantly, it is often considered the first modern urban insurgency (Keegan 2001), which 
influenced by example the course of events during insurgencies as far afield as Vietnam and 
Latin America (Hopkinson 2002). In particular, it was the first well-documented insurgency to 
display many of the characteristics of modern insurgencies, in particular (1) the severely 
asymmetric nature of the conflict, primarily the ability of the modern rifle to wreak apparently 
random mayhem at a distance with little risk for the assailant, (2) the relative plentitude of such 
weapons due to substantial financing of the insurrection (interestingly enough, in this case 
primarily by private citizens of the United States), (3) the occurrence of much of the conflict in an 
urban rather than a rural setting (particularly Dublin and Cork, see Hopkinson 2002 and English 
2003), and (4) the exploitation of modern media to distribute news and propaganda to both the 
region in which the insurrection occurred as well as in the home region of troops engaged in 
suppressing the insurgency. Another interesting point of this particular insurgency is the oft-
remarked quiescent nature of the Irish citizenry until 1916 (Kautt 1999). Additional reasons for 
choosing this conflict is the high degree of documentation available as well as the ability (within 
the United States, at least) to examine this conflict with relative dispassion.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model structure. 
Section 3 describes the parameter and policy sensitivity analyses. Finally, Section 4 discusses 
the implications of this research for further model development.  
2. The Model 
Using the Anglo-Irish War as a base case, this section will build a system dynamics model of 
insurgencies. Because this paper’s goal is not to develop a model of the Anglo-Irish War per se 
but rather only to take a first step towards developing a generic model of insurrections, the model 
will not attempt to capture all of the structure peculiar to the Anglo-Irish War nor tightly calibrate 
the resulting simulation. Instead, it will merely attempt to replicate most of the conflict’s dynamic 
behavior in an approximate sense. For example, for the sake of simplicity, the dynamics in the 
northern six counties of Ulster with Protestant majorities, which willingly remained part of the 
United Kingdom, are ignored. These dynamics, needless to say, were somewhat different and 
more complex than those presented here, because the counties involved contained a sizable 
Catholic minority sympathetic to the insurgency. In contrast, there was no sizable minority of 
Protestants sympathetic to the British Crown in southern Ireland.  
From many accounts (e.g. Kautt 1999, Hopkinson 2002, English 2003), three factors—incident 
suppression, insurgent creation, and war-weariness—seemed to be of decisive importance in the 
Anglo-Irish War (as well as in many other urban insurgencies). There already exists some 
excellent work in the system dynamics literature on insurgencies by Coyle (1985). However, the 
present work differs from his treatment because of its emphasis on (1) urban rather than rural 
settings and (2) on the counter-insurgent’s seat of government existing in a different nation from 
that in which the insurgency is taking place. This will lead to the causal mechanisms of two of the 
three dynamic factors in this paper—insurgent creation and war-weariness—differing 
substantially from those found in Coyle’s work.  
The remainder of the section will present the causal mechanisms behind the three dynamic 
factors in the model as well as describe some associated behaviors in detail.  
2.1 Incident Suppression  
While Ireland had been under England’s control to varying degrees since the twelfth century, it 
only officially became part of the United Kingdom in 1800 after a huge rebellion in 1798 frightened 
the British government in Westminster. However, problems with persistent disenfranchisement of 
the Catholic majority in Ireland, along with issues of land tenure and poor management of the 
potato famine by British authorities in 1845-49, led to further violent rebellions against British rule 
in 1803, 1848, and 1867. These latter three rebellions remained relatively unsupported by the 
population at large. Instead, the focus of popular sentiment shifted to support for reform through 
parliamentary action in Westminster. Home rule, which would have given Ireland a great deal of 
local autonomy, was finally passed by the U.K. parliament in 1914, but its implementation was 
suspended for the duration of World War I.  
It is at this point, when the struggle for home rule had apparently been won and the Irish 
population by all accounts was content—though perhaps not enamored—with British rule, that 
one would least expect the outbreak of a successful rebellion. However, the presence of the First 
World War affected the structure of the system in place at that time. To see how this occurred, 
first consider the basic insurgency suppression structure in Figure 1.  
Figure 1 is known in system dynamics terms as a causal-loop diagram. Following system 
dynamics conventions, each arrow in the diagram represents a link of causation between two 
variables. For example, ceteris paribus, an increase in the number of insurgents[1] active in 
Ireland will result in an increase in the number of incidents committed by those insurgents 
(including raids, snipings, acts of arson, bombings, or other incidents directed at elements of the 
British government.)[2] Because any change (whether an increase or decrease) in the number of 
insurgents will ceterisparibus result in a change in the number of incidents in the same direction, 
the arrow is labeled with an “S” next to it. (An “O” label next to an arrow indicates, in contrast, that 
the two linked variables always move in opposite directions.) Finally, because it feeds back on 
itself, the entire chain of variables in Figure 1 is known as a “causal loop” or, more simply, a loop. 
Causal loops are the building blocks of all system dynamics models.  




To examine the incident suppression loop in Figure 1 more closely, consider the lower right-hand 
side of Figure 1, beginning with the number of insurgents. Each of these insurgents commits a 
number of incidents per month. Over time, the rate of incidents builds up pressure for the 
representatives of the British government in Ireland to reduce the number of incidents. This 
pressure to reduce incidents leads to an increase in the number of house searches, arrests, 
detentions, or other disruptions, resulting in an increased British interference in Irish civil life. This 
disruption does, however, eventually reduce the number of active insurgents. (Note the “O” next 
to the arrow linking British Interference in Civil Life and number of insurgents, indicating that an 
increase (or decrease) in interference will result in a pressure to decrease (or increase) in 
insurgents.) Hence, because of the chain of variables in the causal loop, any increase in the 
number of insurgents will ceteris paribus eventually result in a pressure to reduce (or vice versa) 
that same variable. Because of this behavior, this sort of loop is termed a “balancing loop.” 
Balancing loops are marked within a causal-loop diagram by a “B” inside a circular arrow. Note 
that a short delay in this loop exists between pressure to reduce incidents and coercive acts per 
British soldier, because of the time needed to implement any new coercive policies. However, the 
delay is not marked in this causal loop because it is relatively short in comparison with delays 
contained within other loops in the model.  
Figure 2 presents a simulation of the incident suppression loop. (Note that the model equations in 
their entirety are presented in the Appendix.) There were only approximately 1000 active 
insurgents prior to 1918 in Ireland, although any and all figures from this war—as in most 
insurgencies—are notoriously fuzzy (Kautt 1999). In the absence of any other effects, our 
simulation model shows that these insurgents will quickly either be detained by British authorities 
or retire of their own accord. (For purposes of the model, insurgents are assumed to be active 
between the ages of 15 and 25 years.)  
Figure 2: Simulated Active Insurgents vs. Time When Only the Insurgent Loop is Active  
 
(Month zero represents the beginning of the rebellion in earnest in early-to-mid 1919.)  
 
2.2 Insurgent Creation  
However, the results of Figure 2 are misleading in isolation, because other causal loops are also 
active in the system. The one most often noted in insurgencies is the insurgent creation loop 
presented in Figure 3. This is the loop thought responsible for a tremendous expansion in size of 
the Irish Volunteers and their offspring, the original Irish Republican Army,[3] especially after 
1918 (English 2003). It also seems to be active in many other insurgencies (Kautt 1999, Long 
2006).  
In this loop, British interference in Irish civil life, while leading to the suppression of current 
insurgents, also leads to the Irish public’s general dissatisfaction with British rule. This 
dissatisfaction will lead to new individuals joining the insurgency. This creates the potential for a 
vicious cycle because, ceteris paribus, any increase in the number of insurgents will lead to more 
incidents by the insurgents and hence more pressure to reduce incidents by the British 
government.  
This pressure will result in a greater Interference in Irish Civil Life, which will further reduce Irish 
Satisfaction with British Rule and hence increase the number of insurgents even more, 
completing the causal loop. Because any change in the number of insurgents ultimately 
reinforces itself, this sort causal loop is termed a “reinforcing loop” and is marked with an “R” 
inside a circular arrow in the diagram. Reinforcing loops are most typically the engines of growth 
in SD models. Such reinforcing loops have been missing from many previous models of 
insurgency (Long 2006).  
 




A further wrinkle in this causal loop is that, while some of the effect of dissatisfaction on 
increasing insurgents will occur immediately, the full force effect of dissatisfaction will take some 
time to percolate through the system. The reason for this is that Irish satisfaction with British Rule 
is more likely to fall under a prolonged regime of coercive actions than under a short one. In other 
words, Irish satisfaction with the British government has some inertia. Additionally, once potential 
insurgents are “activated,” most of them will need some time before they can make the 
appropriate connections with the Irish Volunteers, receive training and weapons, and effectively 
add to its forces. These delays (or inertias) in the model are marked by a rectangle containing the 
word “delay” between Irish Satisfaction with British Rule and Number of Insurgents. The net effect 
of this delay is to keep the vicious cycle of the insurgent creation loop from immediately spiraling 
out of control once it is set in motion.  
Finally, an additional “benefit” of a low Irish Satisfaction with British Rule to the insurgents is that 
widespread sympathy to the insurgency among the populace allows the insurgents greater 
mobility and enables them to more easily evade capture. This factor will also lead to a greater 
number of insurgents over the long run.  
From a historical perspective, the general populace of Ireland, according to all reports, was not 
sympathetic to violent rebellion prior to April 1916. Up to that point, a fairly stable equilibrium 
seemed to exist in which the Irish were reasonably satisfied with British rule; hence, insurgent 
incidents were fairly rare. This turned the vicious cycle of insurgency creation into a virtuous one 
in which low Irish dissatisfaction with British rule lead to a small number of insurgents and hence 
less interference by the British with Irish civil life, further reducing the number of insurgents. 
However, two critical things changed because of the First World War. The Irish Volunteers, 
realizing how much of the British Army was tied up in France, saw a chance to escalate the 
conflict. As one part of this effort, they staged a general uprising by seizing several governmental 
buildings in Dublin, including the General Post Office, on Easter Monday in 1916. After a week of 
fighting against five thousand British Regular troops, the participants in the Easter Rising 
surrendered. None of the sympathetic uprisings in outlying areas of Ireland assumed by the 
Rising’s participants ever materialized. Nor did the participants receive any additional support 
from the citizens of Dublin. According to one source, prisoners from the Rising being shipped to 
Wales for detention were actually spat upon by angry Dubliners (Wikipedia, “Easter Rising,” 
2006). Overall, it appeared as if the Rising were a dismal failure similar to the failed rebellions in 
the previous century.  
However, another change had occurred because of World War I. The British government felt 
much greater pressure to suppress dissent in Ireland because of World War I than they would 
have in a time of peace. These two effects are represented in the diagram in Figure 4.  




After the Rising, martial law was immediately declared in Ireland; the first of somewhere between 
twenty and forty thousand unannounced home searches were begun; and approximately 3500 
Irish citizens were arrested. (All of this in a country of only some four million people.) Fifteen of 
the Rising’s leaders were executed by firing squad after secret trials. While, strictly speaking, 
such trials and executions were legal, the Irish populace did not perceive them to be legitimate 
(Kautt 1999).  
These effects are represented in the model shown in Figure 4 by increasing the number of 
incidents per month per number of insurgents as well as increasing, ceteris paribus, the pressure 
on the British government to react for any given number of incidents. Figure 4 also shows the 
effects of propaganda, which the remaining leaders of the Irish Volunteers—having learned from 
the general indifference to the Easter Rising—began to exploit to dramatize to the Irish people the 
perceived excesses of the British government. This was carried out primarily by means of the 
newspapers including the underground, but widely distributed, Irish Bulletin, published by Irish 
Volunteer leaders Desmond FitzGerald and Erskine Childers. Interestingly, counter-propaganda 
efforts by the British government had little impact, perhaps because they were directed primarily 
at bolstering public opinion in Great Britain as well as the loyal counties in Ulster for the counter-
insurgency rather than de-legitimizing the insurgency among the populace of the remainder of 
Ireland. (For a more general discussion of using propaganda and narrative in counter-insurgency, 
see Casebeer and Russell 2005).  
In the simulation, the effect of the reinforcing loop of insurgent creation is shown in Figure 5. 
Instead of the incident suppression loop immediately decreasing the number of insurgents as in 
Figure 2, the number of insurgents actually increases in Figure 5 because the insurgent creation 
loop is activated. However, the full effect of the loop is not felt for nineteen months because of the 
inertia in public opinion and the time it takes for potential insurgents to become active. However, 
after twenty months, the mass influx of new insurgents disappears. In fact, the drop in the number 
of simulated insurgents is slowed only by new potential insurgents becoming of age to actually 
fight, partially balancing the loss of those insurgents who are captured by British forces.[4]  
Figure 5: The Simulated Effect of the Insurgent Creation Loop on Active Insurgents  
 
Figure 6 shows that under this simulated scenario, Ireland enters a state of relatively high rate 
insurgent activity at the same time that the population becomes permanently dissatisfied with 
British rule. Both of these effects occur because of the British troops’ heavy interference in normal 
Irish civil life.  
Figure 6: Simulated Insurgent Activity and Satisfaction with British Rule  
 
 2.3 War Weariness  
However, Figures 4, 5, and 6 do not account for how the insurrection ultimately ends. Figure 7 
completes the model by including a war weariness loop for Great Britain.  




In this loop, as the number of incidents rises, British war weariness increases after a long delay. 
This leads to a removal of troops from Ireland after another, shorter delay reflecting the time it 
takes to issue orders and physically arrange for transport of the troops back from Ireland. This 
loop is marked as a balancing loop because it seems to come into effect only once the insurgent 
creation loop has begun to dominate the model. As a final note, Figure 7 also shows the impact of 
weapons availability on keeping the insurgency alive. This turned out not to be a deciding factor 
in the Anglo-Irish War, primarily due to the financial creativity of Michael Collins, the finance 
minister for the insurgent Irish government. While there is some dispute about this (see Kostick 
1996), we shall leave it out of the current simulation. Nonetheless, lack of guns has exercised a 
decisive impact on other occasions (including the rebellion of 1798). The factors determining 
weapons availability are more fully explored in Coyle (1985) and the finances determining 
weapons availability, in Grynkewich and Reifel (2006).  
Figure 8: Simulated British Troops and Active Insurgents in Full Model  
 
 
The effect of the war-weariness loop on the simulated Irish Insurgency is shown in Figure 8. It is 
important to note that the simulated number of insurgents does not fall at the same rate as does 
the number of British Troops. In fact, the number of simulated insurgents does not begin to fall in 
earnest until after the British withdrawal of troops. Even then, however, the demobilization takes 
some time. One could imagine that it would take a while for the insurgents to demobilize if for no 
other reason than that there is likely no extant procedure for decommissioning weapons. This lag 
in the demobilization of insurgents points to a problem that occurred after the end of the Anglo-
Irish War as well as many other insurgencies. After the insurgency is won, there remain a number 
of armed insurgents who are habituated to settling their arguments with violence. This often leads 
to a situation in which one faction of the insurgents will begin fighting the remainder due to some 
political disagreement. While it is not simulated in the model, this is indeed what happened with 
the Irish Volunteers. After the conflict with the British ended, a civil war began in Ireland between 
pro and anti-peace-treaty forces that did not end until 1923. A particularly egregious example of 
multiple, successive, unstable governments has occurred in Congo-Zaire over the past decade, 
leaving at least four million dead (New York Times 2006).  
To summarize: in this section, a system dynamics model based on the three causal loops of 
incident suppression, insurgent creation, and war weariness was developed. Furthermore, the 
model was able to approximately replicate the dynamic behavior of the Anglo-Irish War. Thus, the 
methodology of system dynamics appears to have some explanatory power for insurgencies. 
However, of even more interest is whether a system dynamics model might be used as a decision 
aid by policy makers. We will examine this topic in the next section.  
3. Sensitivity Analysis 
Because the ultimate aim of this paper is to determine whether the system dynamics 
methodology can be used to aid policy makers, we will explore the sensitivity of the model 
developed in the previous section to a limited set of parameters and policies to see whether any 
intriguing results arise.  
3.1 Reduced Distrust  
For example, one would expect, based on Section 2.2 and Section 2.3, that if the war-weariness 
loop is sufficiently slow or weak, it is possible that the withdrawal of occupying troops might 
actually have improved the overall insurgency’s outcome from the British point of view. In reality 
the Irish were acutely suspicious of British intentions due to the turbulent nature of their centuries-
long relationship. (The simulation captures this by having the time required to satisfy the Irish 
public be much longer than the time to dissatisfy it.)[5] However, in other countries, in which the 
legitimacy of the ruling power is not so suspect, such may not be the case. Under these 
conditions, a less suspicious populace may permit a more aggressive policy of incident 
suppression. To examine this idea, the simulation in Section 2.3 is run with two changes: (1) an 
Irish public more willing to respond favorably to a British reduction of interference in civil life and 
(2) a policy of more coercive acts per soldier per month to suppress insurgency incidents.[6]  
Figure 9: Less Suspicious Populace Scenario  
 
 It should be noted that either of these two changes implemented in isolation will not prevent a 
simulated British withdrawal. However, Figure 9 shows that both changes taken together do in 
fact lead to a sustainable British presence, with a relatively content Irish populace as a bonus. 
Hence, the long-standing attitude of the populace towards the government in power can indeed 
make a difference between success and failure of an insurgency, if it is properly exploited. 
However, Figure 10 also shows that, while these changes will indeed reduce the insurgent 
problem to a sustainable level, they cannot wipe it out entirely. Hence, even under the best of 
circumstances, successful insurgency management may not necessarily end all insurgent activity.  
Figure 10: Active Insurgents under Less Suspicious Populace Scenario  
 
3.2 The “Good Works” Policy  
As another example of potential policy analysis using system dynamics, recall from the 
simulations in Section 2.2 and Section 2.3 that the British could have stayed on in Ireland 
indefinitely if they were indifferent to war weariness. However, this is an unrealistic assumption in 
most cases, particularly if the nation opposing the insurgency is a democracy. Thus, the question 
arises: if the war-weariness loop is indeed active, is there another way to eliminate the insurgency 
or at least marginalize it? One proposal often mooted is to (1) have the troops suppressing an 
insurgency perform a steady number of “good works” such as health and dental clinics for the 
benefit of the populace afflicted by the insurgency and (2) utilize troops drawn from the populace 
as much as possible (Kaplan 2005, Long 2006). This “good works” policy is purported to have the 
following benefits (Kaplan 2005):  
• It reduces the distrust of the populace for the insurgency-suppressing forces and 
consequently the populace’s desire to help the insurgents. Without the populace’s help, 
the insurgents’ mobility is compromised, hence reducing their ability to create incidents 
and to evade capture.  
• It allows the counterinsurgent troops to obtain valuable intelligence from people speaking 
“off-the-cuff” while being treated during these medical clinics (or other similar activities) 
that lead to more efficient capture of insurgents. Some authorities opine that intelligence 
gathered in this manner is of superior value to that obtained during interrogation (Kaplan 
2005).  
The effects of this policy are simulated by doubling the base rate of capture of an insurgent per 
coercive act (which is proxied in the model in the Appendix by halving the base coercion 
fruitfulness) and halving the incidents per insurgent per month. The simulated results of this policy 
compared with the base case are presented in Figures 11 and 12.  
Figure 11: Active Insurgents Under the Base and “Good Works” Scenarios  
 
In this simulation, the Irish satisfaction with British Rule under the “good works” policy is almost 
as high as it was in the base case. However, the number of coercive acts by British troops 
remains higher after month 14 (Figure 12). Combined with an increase in effectiveness per 
coercive act resulting from improved intelligence, the British in this simulation are able to keep the 
maximum number of insurgents about seventy percent lower than in the base case (Figure 11). 
Unlike in Section 3.1, the insurgents do eventually completely disappear. More importantly, the 
British are also never compelled to leave Ireland (which is the only thing that eliminates 
insurgents in the base case).  
 
Figure 12: Coercive Acts by British Troops and Irish Satisfaction with British Government 
Under Base and “Good Works” Scenarios.  
 
 
Because of these results, it would be of interest to examine both components of the “good works” 
policy in isolation. From Figure 13, a higher simulated “fruitfulness” of coercive actions (e.g. 
improving the odds that a house search will lead to a detention of an active insurgent) seems to 
be the primary factor that reduces the maximum number of insurgents in the “good works” policy. 
However, this reduction is not enough to prevent a simulated complete withdrawal of British 
troops beginning in month 29. (The sudden drop to zero of insurgents beginning around at this 
time only occurs because of a British withdrawal.) Hence, this simulation suggests that there may 
be a synergistic effect between increasing the odds of capturing insurgents as well as hampering 
the ability of insurgents to launch attacks. This might explain the observed strength of “good 
works” policies because they change a number of system parameters simultaneously in a 
mutually supporting manner.  
In this section, it should be remembered that no attempt has been made to fully calibrate or 
validate the model. Hence, any conclusions drawn from the current model should be viewed with 
some caution, especially with respect to other insurgencies. Rather, in alignment with the goals of 
this paper, the purpose of the analyses presented herein is merely to illustrate some of the ways 
in which a system dynamics model of insurgency suppression might aid policy makers in their 
decision making.  
Figure 13: Sensitivity of Outcome to Coercion Fruitfulness and Incident Rate  
 
4. Discussion 
The aim of this paper was to demonstrate the potential of system dynamics to aid policy makers 
in developing better insights into the dynamic behavior of insurgencies. In particular, Section 2 
suggested that a model containing the three causal loops of insurgency suppression, insurgency 
creation, and war weariness, might drive the dynamic characteristics behind many insurgencies. 
The case history of the Anglo-Irish War of 1916-21 was used to help illustrate these dynamics as 
well as to make a preliminary examination of some high-leverage system characteristics that may 
be of interest to policy makers. As illustrations of this capability, the paper explored how a lack of 
government legitimacy—such as that faced by the British in Ireland—could hamper efforts to 
suppress an insurgency. Additionally, to illustrate how a system dynamics model might aid policy 
testing, Section 3 explored how the effects of a “good works” policy might contribute to successful 
insurgency suppression. While it was not a specific goal of this paper, two general insights did 
emerge from these analyses. One insight is that no one parameter or policy change is likely to be 
sufficient, in itself, to successfully manage an insurgency. Rather successful insurgency 
management demands policies that create many simultaneous, synergistic changes. A second 
insight is that even a successful insurgency management policy may very possibly fail to 
completely eliminate insurgent activity; it will merely reduce it to an acceptable level.  
These insights should be enough to demonstrate the usefulness of utilizing the system dynamics 
methodology as a tool for insurgency management. However, because this paper was intended 
primarily as a “proof-of-concept” test of using system dynamics for managing insurgencies, much 
work remains to be done before such an approach can be deployed in real life. First of all, the 
model in this paper must be calibrated to any particular conflict of interest, because no two 
conflicts are exactly alike. As stated in the U.S. Marine Corps’ Small Wars Manual (1940), “Small 
wars seldom develop in accordance with any stereotyped procedure.” The psychology of the 
people involved, the physical nature of the territory, the nature of the insurgents’ grievances with 
the incumbent government and what portion of the population has natural sympathies with the 
insurgents: all of these will vary from insurgency to insurgency. Primarily, model calibration 
should involve changes in the numerical parameters in the model. However, it may also involve 
including some additional structure to the model, such as the weapons availability model structure 
in Coyle (1985) and financial concerns (Grynkewich and Reifel 2006).  
Next, a detailed examination of parameter and policy sensitivities must be performed for each 
insurgency, similar to, but more extensive than that presented in this paper. For example, policy 
bundles such as the “good works” policy presented in this paper or the substitution of air for 
ground forces (e.g. the United States in the Vietnam conflict) must be examined, as well as many 
others in order to determine which policy bundle might work best in any given conflict.  
Finally, after the model has been calibrated and used in a number of real-world situations, it 
should become reasonably general. That is, because the basic principles of warfare and 
psychology that govern all conflicts remain consistent, the changes in behavior between models 
calibrated to any two particular conflicts should become merely a function of numerical changes 
in model parameters. This is compatible with the theory of system dynamics, in which the 
structure of the dynamic system creating behavior and events is assumed to be similar in many 
situations, but the parameters governing that structure may create drastically different behavioral 
responses to similar exogenous stimuli (Sterman 2000). In essence then, one system dynamics 
model—properly validated—might be able to provide insight into many different particular 
insurgencies by varying a small number of demographic, psycho-political, fiscal, and geographical 
parameters.  
However, in recent years a final complication to applying system dynamics to insurgency 
management has arisen. Until late in the last century, insurgencies were essentially won or lost in 
isolation from one another. Currently, however, a developing interlinkage between insurgencies in 
geographically (and even ideologically) dispersed locations is beginning to emerge (Kaplan 2005, 
Jinnett 2006). Hence, once the general model for the evolution of an isolated insurrection is 
developed, it will soon become necessary to network a number of such models together in order 
to represent the evolving global reality of interlinked and interdependent insurgencies that will 
characterize the twenty-first century.  
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References  
1. Model variables (any quantity which can be imagined to go up or down) will be italicized to aid 
identification. 
2. These targets sometimes included civilians who worked for the British government as well as 
the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC). The RIC was a paramilitary organization primarily composed 
of Catholic Irish, who nonetheless acted as agents of the British government in Ireland. 
3. The Irish Volunteers morphed into the original Irish Republican Army, which eventually became 
the National Army of the Irish Free State and, later, the Republic of Ireland. Despite its claims, the 
current Provisional Irish Republican Army, which has been active in Northern Ireland between 
1969 and 2005, is considered by most observers to be a separate organization.  
4. While this effect is not captured explicitly in the causal loop diagram in Figure 4, it is contained 
in the model listing in the Appendix. 
5. For readers familiar with system dynamics, this is captured by an exponential smooth 
formulation of satisfaction formulation with two time constants: one for when satisfaction is 
increasing (5 years) and a different one for when satisfaction is decreasing (3 months). This 
formulation follows Oliva and Sterman (2001).  
6. This is implemented in the simulation by reducing the “time to dissatisfy” from 60 months to 3 
months, and reduced the “insurgent parameter” from 2.5 to 0.5. The maximum number of 
“coercive acts per British soldier” is set from 0.2 to 0.4 per month. See the Appendix for how 
these parameters influence the model. The maximum number of “coercive acts per British soldier” 
per month.  
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Appendix: Model Diagram and Listing 
 
Equations  
Active Insurgent Retirement Rate= 
  ACTIVE INSURGENTS/(avg insurgent career in months) 
 Units: people/Month 
  
ACTIVE INSURGENTS= INTEG ( 
 Increase in Insurgents-Insurgent Attrition Rate-Active Insurgent Retirement Rate 
, 
  initial active insurgents) 
Units: people 
 
Active Insurgents Fraction= 
 xidz(ACTIVE INSURGENTS,Total Insurgents,1) 
Units: dmnl 
What fraction of the insurgents are active? 
 








Attrition Rate from Suppression= 
 Coercive Acts per Month*Effect of Insurgent Density*coercion fruitfulness 
Units: people/Month 
The fractional attrition rate from coercive acts. 
 
avg insurgent career in months= 
 avg insurgent career in years*months per year 
Units: months 
 
avg insurgent career in years= 
 10 
Units: years 
The number of years an insurgent will be active assuming that he is  
  not captured. 
 




base coercion fruitfulness= 
 0.1 
Units: people/act 
This modifies how many insurgents will be captured per coercive act  
  in the base case 
 




base insurgent fraction= INITIAL( 
 1000/Potential Insurgents) 
Units: dmnl 
This is the base fraction of the population that will be attracted to  






BRITISH TROOPS IN IRELAND= 
 base british troops in Ireland*Ef on British Troops 
Units: people 
Note that this variable also includes the number of auxilliary troops  
  used in the war such as the Royal Irish Constabulary. 
 
BRITISH WAR WEARINESS= 




This is the desire of the British to pull out of Ireland due to  
  weariness with the insurgency. 
 
BRITISH WITHDRAWL FLAG= INTEG ( 
 Chg in Flag, 
  0) 
Units: dmnl 
If flag is set, then the British have given up and withdrawn their  
  troops from Ireland. 
 
Chg in Flag= 
 if then else((BRITISH WITHDRAWL FLAG=0) :AND: (BRITISH TROOPS IN 
IRELAND<min british troops to hold Ireland 
),1/TIME STEP, 0) 
Units: dmnl/Month 
This will set the BRITISH WITHDRAWL FLAG once British presence in  
  Ireland (as measured by active troops) has fallen below a minimal  
  threshold. 
 
Chg in Satisfaction= 
 (Indicated Irish Satisfaction with British Rule-IRISH SATISFACTION WITH BRITISH 
RULE 
)/if then else(Indicated Irish Satisfaction with British Rule>IRISH SATISFACTION WITH BRITISH 
RULE 
,time to satisfy,time to dissatisfy) 
Units: dmnl/Month 
This measures how quickly Irish satisfaction with British rule  
  changes. Note that the time for satisfaction to decrease and to  
  increase are different. 
 
coercion fruitfulness= 
 base coercion fruitfulness*Ef on Attrition Rate 
Units: people/act 
This modifies how many insurgents will be captured per coercive act  





This causes the coercive acts per British soldier to have diminishing  
  returns to the "pressure to reduce incidents". It should be set to be  
  less than one. 
 




coercive act per Irish citizen= 
 Coercive Acts per Month/population 
Units: acts/person/Month 
How much is the average Irish citizen aware of coercive acts by the  
  British Government? 
 
Coercive Acts per British Soldier= 
 smoothi(1-exp(-coercion parameter*PRESSURE TO REDUCE INCIDENTS),coercion 
response time 
,0)*max coercive acts 
Units: acts/person/Month 
Acts of house searching, detainment, etc. that may lead to arrest of  
  an insurgent. It is an increasing function of the pressure to reduce  
  incidents with diminishing returns. It also saturates at "max  
  coercive acts" 
 
Coercive Acts per Month= 
 BRITISH TROOPS IN IRELAND*Coercive Acts per British Soldier*incident suppression 
loop sw 
Units: acts/Month 
Total coercive acts by all British troops and paramilitaries in  
  Ireland. Includes house searches, etc. 
 
Ef of Weapons on Pressure= 
 1-exp(-weapons availability*weapons parameter) 
Units: dmnl 
This is an increasing function with a max at one. 
 
Ef on Attrition Rate= 
 if then else( insurgent creation loop switch=1,IRISH SATISFACTION WITH BRITISH 
RULE 
^attrition parameter,1)*(1-BRITISH WITHDRAWL FLAG) 
Units: dmnl 
This is a multiplier that affects coercive fruitfulness depending on  
  Irish satisfaction with British rule. If the Irish are highly  
  dissatisfied, they will make it diffiucult for the British coercive  
  acts to result in capturing an insurgent. 
 
Ef on British Troops= 
 smoothi(exp(-BRITISH WAR WEARINESS*troop parameter)*(1-BRITISH WITHDRAWL 
FLAG), 
time to move troops, 1) 
Units: dmnl 
The wearier the British public is with the war, the less troops they  
  maintain in Ireland. Once British Troops have completely pulled out,  
  however, they never come back. 
 Ef on Insurgent Numbers= 




Effect of Irish Satisfaction (or lack thereof) on Irish insurgents 
 
Effect of Insurgent Density= 
 (ACTIVE INSURGENTS/base population)/base insurgent density 
Units: dmnl 
What is the effect of insurgent density on finding an insurgent 
 
FINAL TIME  = 120 
Units: Month 
The final time for the simulation. 
 
fraction of males liable to join insurgency= INITIAL( 
 avg insurgent career in years/lifespan in years/2) 
Units: dmnl 
Males are half of population. We assume males between ages of 15 and  
  30 will want to become insurgents. 
 
fractional attrition rate per incident= 
 0.01 
Units: persons/incident 
How many insurgents are captured/killled per incident. 
 
Inactive Insurgent Retirement Rate= 
 INACTIVE INSURGENTS/avg insurgent career in months 
Units: people/Month 
Lifespan of insurgents before "retiring" is assumed to be finite. 
 
INACTIVE INSURGENTS= INTEG ( 
 Insurgent Attrition Rate-Inactive Insurgent Retirement Rate, 
  0) 
Units: people 
The number of captured and dead insurgents who would have remained  
  active if they had been able to. 
 
incident suppression loop sw= 
 1 
Units: dmnl 
0 = No Incident Suppression Loop; 1 = Incident Suppression Loop on 
 




Increase in Insurgents= 
 max(if then else (Indicated Insurgents<Total Insurgents,1,Active Insurgents Fraction 
)*(Indicated Insurgents-Total Insurgents 
 )/time to join insurgency, 
 -ACTIVE INSURGENTS/minimum demobilization time for insurgents)*insurgent creation 
loop switch 
Units: people/Month 
This drives the number of active insurgents to what their indicated  
  level should be based on Irish satisfaction with British Rule.  
  However, there is also a maximum rate at which they leave to prevent  
  the active insurgent stock from going negative. This would represent  
  the tendency of some fraction of the insurgents to be extremely hard  
  line. 
 
Indicated Insurgents= 
 base insurgent fraction*potential insurgent fraction activated*Potential Insurgents 
Units: people 
This is how many insurgents there could be if they could immediately  
  "join up" and pick up arms. 
 
Indicated Irish Satisfaction with British Rule= 




This is how satisfied the Irish would be with British rule absent any  
  legacy effects. It's primarily determined by the British interference  
  in Irish Civil life through coercive acts. 
 




INITIAL TIME  = 0 
Units: Month 
The initial time for the simulation. 
 
Insurgent Attrition Rate= 
 Insurgent Incidents*fractional attrition rate per incident+Attrition Rate from Suppression 
Units: people/Month 
Number of insurgents detained, killed, or going "AWOL" per month. 
 
insurgent creation loop switch= 
 1 
Units: dmnl 
0 = Loop Off; 1 = Loop On 
 
Insurgent Incidents= 
 ACTIVE INSURGENTS*incidents per insurgent per month 
Units: incidents/Month 
How many raids, snipings, bombings etc. are committed in total by all  





Power that modifies the effect of Irish Satisfaction with British  
  rule on Insurgent numbers. This power should be greater than 1. 
 
IRISH SATISFACTION WITH BRITISH RULE= INTEG ( 
 Chg in Satisfaction, 
  1) 
Units: dmnl 
This is an index of how satisfied the Irish are with British rule.  
  Note that there is a first-order delay between the indicated  
  satisfaction as a function of current British coercive acts and the  
  change in perceptions by the Irish people. 
 




max coercive acts= 
 0.2 
Units: acts/person/Month 
This is a limit on how many coercive acts a British soldier could  
  commit per month 
 








minimum insurgent fraction activated= 
 0.1 
Units: dmnl 
There are always some discontents in most societies 
 





 base population*(1+annual growth rate/12)^Time 
Units: people 
The base population increases with time 
 
potential insurgent fraction activated= 
 minimum insurgent fraction activated+Ef on Insurgent Numbers 
Units: dmnl 
What fraction of potential insurgents actually want to take up arms 
 
Potential Insurgents= 
 fraction of males liable to join insurgency*population 
Units: people 
Number of population who could be converted to insurgents if the  
  conditions are right. 
 
PRESSURE TO REDUCE INCIDENTS= 
 Insurgent Incidents*Ef of Weapons on Pressure/ref incidents 
Units: dmnl 
This is the effect of incidents on the urgency felt by British govt.  
  to do something about it. The effect of this will be lagged in its  
  outcomes. 
 
ref coercions per Irish citizen= 
 0.0001 
Units: acts/Month/person 





Scaling factor for impact of incidents on pressure on the British  





This should be set to less than one to ensure diminishing returns to  
  coercive acts 
 
SAVEPER  =  
        TIME STEP 
Units: Month 
The frequency with which output is stored. 
 
TIME STEP  = 0.25 
Units: Month 
The time step for the simulation. 
 
time to dissatisfy= 
 3 
Units: Month 
Time needed to upset the Irish 
 























Should be set to less than one to ensure diminishing returns 
 
war weariness switch= 
 1 
Units: dmnl 





This is an variable that accounts for fact that if the insurgents are  





Availability of weapons rapidly escalates the effect of any incident 
 
